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Abstract We propose a direct measure of altruism between parents and adult
children, using survey data on happiness from the German Socio-Economic
Panel for the years 2000–2004. The question of altruism within families has
policy relevance, for example, to understand whether public transfers crowd
out private ones. Previous empirical evidence, based on observed transfer
behavior, has failed to establish a clear consensus. Using various cross section,
panel data, and instrumental variable estimators, we find a robust association
between the happiness of parents and that of their adult children. A 1 standard
deviation increase in a child’s happiness is associated with the same increase in
own happiness as that of a 20–45% increase in household income, depending
on specification.
Keywords Utility interdependence · Sympathy · Panel data
JEL Classification D64 · C25 · J10
“How selfish soever man may be supposed, there are evidently some
principles in his nature, which interest him in the fortune of others, and
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render their happiness necessary to him, though he derives nothing from
it except the pleasure of seeing it.”
Adam Smith (1790)
“...we might suppose that the object which X (whose own utility is P)
tends—in a calm, effective moment—to maximise, is not P but P + λ;
where λ is a coef f icient of ef fective sympathy.”
Francis Ysidro Edgeworth (1881, p. 53)
1 Introduction
Altruism denotes the willingness to make voluntary transfers of resources to
another person or other persons, disregarding of own benefit. The empirical
importance of altruism for economics has been debated for several decades,
yet no clear consensus has emerged so far. An initial literature was concerned
with the way resources are distributed within the extended family and its
consequences for optimal public transfer policies (Becker 1981; Altonji et al.
1992). More recently, evidence on widespread pro-social behavior in labo-
ratory experiments has led to renewed interest in altruism and challenged
the view that economic agents mostly behave selfishly (Fehr and Fischbacher
2003). Importantly, altruistic behavior is found not only among related family
members but also among strangers in one-shot interactions.
Behavior-based research of altruism faces the obstacle that such transfers
can almost always be attributed to a number of different motives. If the motive
for a transfer is “nothing except the pleasure of seeing the happiness of others”,
as Adam Smith puts it, then we have indeed an instance of genuine altruism.
But other motives reflect plain selfishness because they give the donor a
personal benefit. Among the possible benefits are “joy-of-giving” or “warm
glow” effects (Andreoni 1990), whereby the act of giving provides a source of
satisfaction per se, for example, by according prestige or respect to the donor, a
benefit that is independent of how the beneficiary values the transfer. Another
potential benefit is reciprocity, i.e., the expectation that a favor is returned in
the future. Also, pro-social behavior can lead to positive reputation effects that
eventually provide material benefits.
While the literature has proposed a number of tests between these alter-
native explanations, some based on observational data, others on laboratory
experiments (e.g., Altonji et al. 1992; Ribar and Wilhelm 2002; Fehr and
Fischbacher 2003), we suggest in this paper an alternative route for uncovering
genuine altruism, namely by exploiting information on measured utility of
people. Such information can reveal the extent to which preferences are other
regarding or interdependent. Interdependent preferences, in turn, can be seen
as the proximate mechanism by which genuinely altruistic behavior is induced
in humans. In other words, without interdependent preferences, all observed
behaviors of apparently altruistic transfers would need to be ascribed to selfish
motives.
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In this sense, interdependent preferences are more fundamental to altruism
than actual transfers: the absence of transfers (or altruistic behavior more
broadly defined) in a specific period and environment does not rule out
altruism in general, while the absence of interdependent preferences does. For
the former, consider the situation of parents and their children: If income flows
are very similar, altruistic parents will not make transfers although they would
do so if a sufficiently large income gap were to develop.
The approach we propose is based on self-reported happiness as a proxy for
utility. We analyze the extent of interdependent preferences in the context of
parents and their adult children who have moved out and live on their own.
The objective of the paper is thus to test whether and to what extent parents’
happiness is related to that of their children. For that purpose, a unique linked
parent–child dataset has been extracted from the German Socio-Economic
Panel (GSOEP) for the years 2000 to 2004.
Our primary finding is that of a strong association between the utility
proxies, i.e., evidence for interdependent preferences. We explore a number
of potential explanations, including shared environment, inherited predispo-
sition toward happiness, paternalistic preferences, and reversed causation.
The positive association persists after controlling for a host of socioeconomic
background variables and, exploiting the longitudinal structure of the data,
individual specific time invariant fixed effects. We also performed instrumental
variable estimation, although it is difficult to find credible instruments in the
data, and the required exclusion restrictions may not hold for the instruments
we used. While this leaves some uncertainty as to the magnitude of the
association, we can reject the null hypothesis of no preference independence
in all specifications. This robustness supports the view that parents’ and child’s
happiness are indeed related and that this relation can be measured in survey
data. Depending on specification, a 1.5 point (1 standard deviation) increase in
child’s happiness is associated with an increase in parents’ reported happiness
that equals that of a 20–45% increase in own income.
2 Happiness and altruism
Measures of happiness have been developed and tested extensively in psy-
chological research (Diener 1984). In the simplest case, there is a single
item question on life satisfaction or happiness. According to Veenhoven,
“happiness is the degree to which a person evaluates the overall quality of his
present life-as-a-whole positively” (Veenhoven 1988, p.3.) There is a general
consensus that subjective well-being taps primarily into cognitive dimensions,
to a large extent independently of affect (Diener et al. 1985).
These happiness data are increasingly used to tackle important questions
in economics, as reviewed in Frey and Stutzer (2002), Layard (2005), and Di
Tella and MacCulloch (2006). Indeed, the recent surge in interest is quite
dramatic, as pointed out by Clark et al. (2008a), who counted 417 happiness
related articles between 1960 and 2005 in Econlit. Of these, 76% had been
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published since 1995 and 30% since 2003. Most of these papers use, in one way
or another, answer to current happiness or life satisfaction questions in cross
section and panel survey data to study the factors that determine well-being,
among them economic policies and institutions. Some of them test whether
happiness predicts behavior. Clark et al. (1998) show that low job satisfaction
predicts quits; Clark et al. (2008b) show that low happiness among married
people predicts divorce.
The majority of papers has taken an individualistic approach to happiness:
One person’s happiness is not directly affected by how happy others are.
Instead, there has been a substantial amount of work on indirect interdepen-
dence, such as status interdependence or other kinds of externalities (e.g.,
Clark and Oswald 1996). Where direct interdependence has been studied, it
has been limited to happiness interdependence among individuals within the
same household (e.g., Shields and Price 2005; Winkelmann 2005; Powdthavee
2009).
In this paper, we broaden the scope of analysis and investigate interdepen-
dence among individuals living in separate households. Clearly, it is meaning-
less to search for interdependence between randomly selected households. The
households must be somehow related, know each other, communicate, and
interact. In our case, the relationship is that of kinship, as we consider par-
ent households and child households. Alternative relationships are possible.
Fowler and Christakis (2008), for instance, analyze happiness interdependence
among friends.
Our focus on the relationships between parents and children ties in with
the economic literature on altruism within extended family. Becker (1981,
1991), taking seriously the Edgeworth (1881) proposal, formalized altruism
within a framework of utility maximization under interdependent preferences.
Formally, suppose that
Vp = U p + ηUk
where the total utility of a parent Vp is additively related to the child’s utility
Uk. In this very simple model, η is the “coefficient of effective sympathy”, to
follow Edgeworth’s definition, or, in our context, the altruism parameter. If η is
0, we have a situation of non-interdependent preferences, or “selfishness”. For
positive η, an increase in the child’s utility leads to an increase in the parent’s
utility. We call this situation one of “altruistic preferences”. A negative η would
reflect envy.
Becker (1981) showed that utility function 1 implies altruistic behavior:
Under certain circumstances, parents will transfer resources to their children.
But the inverse conclusion does not hold: Transfers can have many motives,
and knowing whether they are driven by altruism, exchange, or joy of giving
is relevant for many policy questions, including efficient reform of old age
security, long-term care, and social assistance. It can be shown, e.g., that
attempts by governments to redistribute income between generations can be
neutralized if families are altruistic since if the income of a beneficiary of an
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altruistic transfer is increased, that transfer will be reduced by an equal amount
(see Laferrére and Wolff 2006, for a recent survey of the literature).
The majority of empirical papers estimate inter-household transfer equa-
tions where the amount of transfers from parents to children is regressed on
the parents’ income and income of the child together with other variables.
Subsequently, tests can be set up to verify predictions from the model of
altruistic families. However, this approach requires specific data on transfer
payments between family members. As indicated by Altonji et al. (1992), the
timing of transfers is arbitrary, so that studies that are not able to cover a long
period may lead to incorrect conclusions. In addition, non-monetary transfers,
such as services or household produced goods, are difficult to observe.
3 Data
Our empirical analysis is based on the 2000–2004 waves of the GSOEP. This
panel household survey was started in 1984 with a random sample of 5,624
households in West Germany (Wagner et al. 1993). In 1990, it was augmented
by a sample of East German households. From the outset, an attempt was
made to trace and interview adult children who moved from their parents’
household to live in an own household alone or together with a partner and
own children. If the tracing was successful, the GSOEP allows to link the
original household with its spin-off(s). It is therefore possible to merge data on
parents with those on their children who have moved out. Initially, such cases
were rare but in recent years the number of linkable parent–child observations
became quite large, enabling the kind of analysis we want to conduct. We
therefore selected the year 2000 as our first year of analysis. For that year,
we could identify 930 parent households with linkable spin-offs. By 2004, that
number had increased to 1,118 parent households.
The basic unit of observation is a parent–child pair. We started by extracting
all parents. If we could find for any of these fathers or mothers in any year
information on at least one child living in a spin-off household, this parent–
child pair constitutes one observation. Each additional year for a given child,
or each additional child in a given year, generates one additional observation.
The cross-sectional structure of the dataset from the parents’ point of view,
for the year 2002, is depicted in Table 1. There were 1,750 parents for
whom information on up to five children not living in the same household
was available. Information for exactly one adult child not living in the same
household was present for 1,317 parents. Three hundred sixty-three parents
can be matched to two children and so on. All together, the 2002 data comprise
2,264 observations (= parent/child pairs). From the total of 1,750 parents, 1,454
or 83% are couples whereas the remaining 296 cases refer to single parents.
In the 2000–2004 time dimension, the data form an unbalanced panel. The
number of parents (counting mothers and fathers separately) with at least one
entry in any of the 5 years is 2,562; 26.4% of parents are observed at most three
times, 19.6% are included four times, and the remaining 54.0% is observed in
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Table 1 Structure of the data set 2002
Children not living in Number of parents Mothers Fathers Number of
parents’ household observations
Frequency % Frequency Frequency Frequency %
1 1,317 75.3 708 609 1,317 58.0
2 363 20.7 199 164 726 32.2
3 61 3.5 33 28 183 8.1
4 7 0.4 4 3 28 1.2
5 2 0.1 1 1 10 0.4
Total 1,750 100 945 805 2,264 100
Parents in 2-parent 1,454 83.1 – – – –
households
Source: GSOEP 2002
all 5 years, adding up to 8,630 separate parent-year observations. The total
number of adult and independently living children contributing at least one
observation is 2,009. Again, many children are observed repeatedly over time,
so that there is a total of 6,520 child-year observations.
The particular structure of the dataset deserves some comment, as it de-
viates from the standard random sampling assumption in a number of ways,
necessitating corresponding adjustments to the econometric analysis. First,
there are multiple observations for the same parent–child pair over time. Time
invariant effects can be accounted for by using fixed effects, random effects, or
by adjusting the standard errors for clustering.
Second, at any point in time, there can be either one or two parent–child
observations in the same household. Two observations occur if both mothers
and fathers respond in the survey. Household effects can be either period
specific or time invariant. In the latter case, since parents are nested within
households, household fixed effects do not contribute anything over and above
parent fixed effects mentioned previously. In the former case, it is not an
option to condition on period specific household effects since the main variable
of interest, child happiness, does not vary between fathers and mothers at one
point in time. Instead, standard errors can be adjusted for clustering at the
household level.
Third, instances where the same parent is matched to several children
constitute a problem in a regression context. The stochastic error capturing
the unobserved determinants of a parents happiness is essentially the same,
regardless of whether we condition on the happiness of a first or that of a
second child, and hence, these observations cannot be independent. While
this does not make running a regression technically impossible, one would
need to account for the near perfect correlation when computing standard
errors. Alternatively, one can average over the children’s observations and
run the regression using such synthetic parent–child pairs. This approach is
chosen in this paper. It also ensures that parents with multiple children do not
get stronger weights in the regression than parents with a single child. The
sensitivity of the results to taking averages was explored by using alternative
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samples limited to parents with one child or the oldest child only, but none of
the substantive conclusions was affected.
For each parent and child, we extracted a wide range of household and
person specific socioeconomic variables. Happiness is measured using the
following question: “How satisfied are you with your life, all things consid-
ered? Please answer according to the following scale: “0” means completely
dissatisfied, “10” means completely satisfied”. Life satisfaction and happiness
are treated here as synonymous. Potential determinants of happiness include
age, age squared, health, gender, nationality, years of education, marital status,
whether widowed, whether divorced, household size, number of children, place
of abode, employment status, and income. Health is measured by a self-rating
of the respondents on a five-point scale and converted to a “good-health”
indicator for the values 4 and 5. Income is measured as disposable monthly
post-government income of the household. Instead of applying an arbitrary
equivalence scale, all models adopt a flexible specification of economies of
scale by including the log of household size, in addition to the log of household
income.
The following variables are extracted for adult children not living in the
parent’s household: age, gender, marital status, health, education, employment
status, and household income. They are computed in the same way as they
were for parents. In Table 2, we see that the arithmetic mean of the happiness
Table 2 Descriptive statistics
Parents Children
Variable Mean Standard deviation Mean Standard deviation
Happiness 6.57 1.80 7.06 1.59
Female 0.54 0.50 0.51 0.50
Age 57.4 8.7 30.7 6.1
Good health 0.31 0.46 0.70 0.46
Married 0.82 0.38 0.46 0.50
Years of schooling 11.2 2.4 12.3 2.5
Unemployed 0.08 0.28 0.07 0.25
Retired 0.33 0.47
House ownership 0.56 0.50 0.26 0.44
Log household income 8.29 0.52 8.16 0.56
Log household size 0.80 0.39 0.77 0.54
Distance (in km) 49.3 112.1
Same district 0.64 0.48
Number of children 1.97 1.19
Age at leaving home 23.3 4.4
Year 2000 0.18 0.39 0.18 0.39
Year 2001 0.19 0.39 0.19 0.39
Year 2002 0.20 0.40 0.20 0.40
Year 2003 0.21 0.41 0.21 0.41
Year 2004 0.22 0.41 0.22 0.41
Observations 8,630a 6,520b
Source: GSOEP 2000–2004
aExcludes multiple person-year observations for parents with several children
bExcludes multiple person-year observations for children with two parents
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response is a 6.6 for parents and a 7.1 for children. Parents are on average about
26.7 years older than their adult children. Children report a substantially better
health than parents (70% as opposed to 31% with “good health”). On the other
hand, the marital rate is much lower among adult children than among parents
(46% as opposed to 82%). Fewer adult children own a house, and their average
log income is about 13 log points below that of their parents.
We also observe when children left their parental home and how far they
moved. The average age at moving out is 23.3 years. Since the average age at
the time of survey is 30.7, it means that these children have lived on their own
for an average of about 7 years. There is substantial variation in the time away.
About 20% of all children have moved within the last 2 years; about 25% of
all children have moved out more than 10 years earlier. One might suspect
that the elapsed time since moving out can affect the strength of measured
preference interdependence, an interaction that will be tested.
A similar moderation might result from the distance between parent and
child. For example, any happiness interdependence effectively requires that
parents know about their children’s momentary happiness, and distance can
serve as a measure of the quality of that information. For example, the
greater the distance between the households, the less accurately might parents
be informed about the living conditions and well-being of their children. In
addition, of course, distance itself might directly influence a parent’s happiness.
We employ two measures for geographical distance (this part of research
using regional information was carried out at the DIW Berlin. We thank the
staff for making the information available). The first is a simple indicator
whether or not the child lives in the same district as the parents—this is the
case for 65% of all children. The second is the distance in kilometers, using
the geographical coordinate of the county of residence’s midpoint (European
Terrestrial Reference System, ETRS89). The average distance between a
parent’s household and a child’s household amounts to 49 km.
4 Results
What prima facie evidence is there for interdependent happiness in our data?
In particular, is it the case that happier parents also have happier children?
Table 3 shows a simple cross-tabulation of happiness for parents and children.
Observations are pooled over 5 years. The original 11-point scale is collapsed
into a trichotomy: 0–5, 6–7, and 8–10 corresponding to the notions of below,
average, and above average happiness, respectively. The table reveals a strong
positive association between the happiness of adult children and the happiness
of their parents. For example, only 23% of parents of adult children with below
average happiness report an above average happiness themselves, compared
to 44% of those parents with above average happy adult children. A formal
Pearson chi-squared test rejects the independence hypothesis with p value
of zero. A similar result is obtained when the original 11-point scale is used
instead of the grouped categories.
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Table 3 Happiness responses
of parents and children
(in percent, n = 8,630)
Source: GSOEP 2000–2004
Happiness Happiness of child
of parent 0–5 6–7 8–10 Total
0–5 40.0 27.9 20.1 26.6
6–7 36.9 40.7 36.3 38.3
8–10 23.1 31.4 43.6 35.1
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
As mentioned before, the association in happiness of parents and children
can reflect genetic and environmental factors as well as a true causal inter-
dependence due to altruistic preferences. If happiness between parents and
children were causally related, then one would expect to find that changes in
happiness of parents are related to changes in happiness of children. Such an
association is more convincing evidence for a causal relation, as it eliminates
any potential confounding interference of time-invariant genetic and environ-
mental factors. In Table 4, we show the distribution of year-to-year changes
in a parent’s happiness (decline/increase) conditional on year-to-year changes
in the reported child happiness. The first two columns are for any decrease or
increase, respectively, whereas the second two columns refer to large changes
in a child’s happiness, a decline or increase by a minimum of three points on
the 11-point response scale.
Indeed, we find an association in first differences as well. For example,
the relative frequency of an increase in happiness for parents is lowered by
7.1 percentage points if the child’s happiness decreased by a minimum of 3,
compared to the case where the child’s happiness increased by a minimum of 3.
In the “all changes” comparison, the corresponding association is reduced to a
4.6 percentage points difference. A Pearson chi-squared test indicates rejection
of the independence assumption.
To summarize, the evidence is compatible with the notion that part of the
association in happiness responses of parents and adult children is due to direct
utility interdependence, or altruism. However, such a descriptive analysis
cannot rule out that there are alternative explanations for interdependence.
For a closer understanding of what these results tell us about altruism, we turn
now to a more formal modeling approach.
Table 4 Changes in
happiness responses of
parents between t − 1 and t,
conditional on changes for
children (in percent)
Source: GSOEP 2000–2004
Change in happiness Change in happiness of child
of parent Any change Large change
≤ −1 ≥ +1 ≤ −3 ≥ +3
Decrease 55.5 50.9 59.6 52.5
Increase 45.5 49.1 40.4 47.5
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Observations 1,173 954 166 143
p value chi-squared 0.036 0.204
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4.1 Regression models of parental well-being
A stochastic version of a linearized utility function of parents can be written as
Vp = U p + ηUk + u (1)
where Vp is the overall utility function, U p = U(xp) is the utility that parents
derive from things other than their child’s well-being, Uk = U(xk) is the
child’s utility, u is a stochastic error term, and η is the altruism parameter of
interest. xp and xk include all factors that have been identified by the previous
happiness literature as determinants of individual well-being. In traditional
microeconomic utility models, as exemplified by Becker (1981), this would be
primarily own consumption. The subjective well-being approach is broader,
however, and x therefore includes many other factors, such as marital status,
health, and employment, besides income and consumption.
The important assumption captured by Eq. 1, apart from linearity, is the
absence of paternalistic preferences. By this, we mean that xk enters the
parents’ overall utility not directly but only by way of mediation through the
child’s utility U(xk). This assumption may not be very plausible, depending
on the variable xk we have in mind. We can easily think of some factors that
make the child happy but the parent unhappy (such as perhaps an extramarital
affair of the son or daughter). For other variables (such as age), the exclusion
restriction of no direct effect may be more reasonable. Of course, the presence
of paternalistic preferences does not mean that a parent cannot have altruistic
preferences at the same time. It only makes its measurement from survey data
harder, as it generates endogeneity in model 1, through correlation between
Uk and u. We return to this issue later.
Finally, the model does not say anything about more complex patterns of
happiness interdependence, such as altruism of children toward their parents,
or altruism between spouses. With altruism among spouses, a third term,
Vs, should be included. An increase in child happiness increases Vp directly,
through η, and indirectly, through its effect on Vs. Equation 1 should then be
interpreted as a partial reduced form, measuring the overall effect.
4.2 Pooled data regressions
Happiness equations are often estimated using the ordered probit or the
ordered logit model. However, as pointed out by Van Praag and Ferrer-i-
Carbonell (2004), such models imply an implicit cardinalization as well. While
linear regression models do not allow to draw inference on single outcome
probabilities (such as the probability of scoring an 8 or above on a 0–10
response scale), trade-off ratios can be computed, and there is widespread
evidence (explored among others in Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Frijters, 2004) that
these are quite robust to the choice of model. We use here the linear model
approach since it makes the required extensions to panel data and instrumental
variable methods much more transparent.
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First, let us consider the simplest model where xp and xk are independent
and there are no paternalistic preferences. For this case, we can rewrite the
utility function 1 as
Vp = ηUk + v
where v = U p + u and η = Cov(Vp, Uk)/Var(Uk). Hence, a valid estimator of
the altruism coefficient can be obtained from a simple bivariate regression of
Vp on Uk using pooled data. From the first column of Table 5, we find that
the estimated altruism parameter is ηˆ = 0.25. Since the standard deviations of
parents’ and children’s happiness are 1.8 and 1.6, respectively, this parameter
corresponds to a correlation of 0.21. The correlation is highly significant.
The required assumption that xp and xk are unrelated is not very plausible.
For example, it is known that intergenerational mobility in education and
income is limited (for Germany, see, e.g., Dustmann 2004 and Lillard 2001).
Table 5 Regression results for parent’s happiness, N = 8,630
Eq. 1 Eq. 2 Eq. 3 Eq. 4 Eq. 5
Parent Child
Happiness of child (η) 0.250a 0.168a 0.168a 0.041b 0.084a
(0.019) (0.017) (0.018) (0.020) (0.025)
Transfers (yes/no) 0.082 0.076 0.007 0.011
(0.063) (0.064) (0.066) (0.051)
East Germany −0.310a −0.345a – –
(0.063) (0.064)
Good health 1.088a 1.079a 0.048 0.392a 0.393a
(0.047) (0.046) (0.064) (0.052) (0.043)
Unemployed −0.628a −0.617a 0.066 −0.378a −0.383a
(0.098) (0.098) (0.088) (0.118) (0.076)
Retired −0.114 −0.111 0.067 0.067
(0.079) (0.078) (0.083) (0.069)
House ownership 0.275a 0.251a 0.131c −0.040 −0.041
(0.059) (0.060) (0.071) (0.180) (0.112)
Log household income 0.624a 0.627a −0.162b 0.301a 0.291a
(0.067) (0.068) (0.069) (0.110) (0.072)
Log household size −0.284b −0.281a 0.105 0.204 0.209
(0.115) (0.115) (0.105) (0.177) (0.132)
Distance −0.065b −0.060b −0.069 −0.069
(0.029) (0.029) (0.072) (0.047)
Same county −0.036 −0.024 −0.113 −0.114
(0.073) (0.074) (0.132) (0.099)
Fixed effects No No No Yes Yes
Instruments No No No No Yes
Analysis based on data from the German Socio-economic Panel 2000–2004. Standard errors in
parentheses; in models 1 to 3, they have been adjusted for clustering at the individual level. The xk
column in model 3 in italics refers to the child characteristics. All models include a constant and,
except for model 1, four dummies indicating the survey year, a polynomial in age, gender, marital
status, and years of schooling
aSignificant at 1%
bSignificant at 5%
cSignificant at 10%
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Therefore, children of parents with above average income tend to have above
average income themselves. Moreover, the education–health gradient means
that healthier parents have healthier children. As a consequence, xp and xk are
likely correlated, and the least squares regression coefficient from estimating
Eq. 1 could be upward biased.
An obvious remedy to this problem is to assume that U p is a linear function
of xp, to include the parents’ control variables xp in Eq. 1, and to estimate η
from the regression of Vp on Uk and xp:
Vp = α + x′pβ + ηUk + u (2)
The results for such a regression are shown in the second column of Table 5.
Controlling for other socioeconomic factors and thereby accounting for the
correlation in consumption, endowments, and preferences between parents
and children lead to a slightly reduced estimate of ηˆ = 0.17. The other aspects
of model 2 mostly corroborate previous results for well-being equations known
from the literature: health, unemployment, income, household size, and house
ownership enter in a statistically significant way (see, for example, Clark and
Oswald 1994 and Shields and Price 2005 for typical well-being estimates). East
Germans have a lower happiness, ceteris paribus, than West Germans (see also
Frijters et al. 2004).
In principle, a positive relationship between a child’s happiness and that of
its parents may also be due to joy of giving. If parents derive direct happiness
from making a transfer to their child, regardless of the consequences of the
transfer for the child’s utility, then such joy of giving will erroneously be inter-
preted as altruism. Thus, we included an indicator variable for the presence of
monetary transfers over the course of the previous year. In principle, therefore,
the joy of giving motive and the altruism motive can be estimated and tested
separately. However, the coefficient on transfers is small and not statistically
significant, and we thus find no evidence for a joy of giving motive.
The altruism parameter can be interpreted in terms of equivalent income
variation. In the linear specification, this is simply the scaled ratio of two
coefficients. Specifically, since income enters in logs, the effect is proportional:
A doubling of income (an increase by ln 2 = 0.69 log points) is predicted to
increase the linear index ceteris paribus by 0.43; the change in happiness
associated with a one point increase in a child’s happiness is 0.17, or about
40% of that associated with a doubling in income. This is a substantial amount.
A simple extension of model 2 can account for paternalistic preferences.
Re-write the model as
Vp = α + ηUk + x′pβ + x′kγ + u (3)
Here, γ measures the direct effect of the child’s well-being determinants on
parental happiness, ceteris paribus, for given child well-being, i.e., netting out
the effect of “sympathy”. The altruism parameter η is then identified through
residual variation in Uk that is unrelated to the observed child characteristics
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xk. The absence of paternalistic preferences can be tested via the restriction
H0 : γ = 0.
The third column of Table 5 shows the results for the augmented regression
model 3. The coefficients and standard errors pertaining to child variables are
printed in italics. Most of these coefficients are insignificant at conventional
levels. For example, according to our estimates, neither health, marital status,
nor employment status have a direct effect on parental happiness, for a given
child happiness. Indeed, we cannot reject the joint hypothesis of no paternal-
istic preferences (the p value of the F test is 11.7%). On the other hand, the
altruism parameter is almost unchanged, relative to the model without direct
inclusion of the child variables. The evidence lends support for the simpler
model 2, where parent–child interdependence is entirely captured by direct
utility interdependence. This conclusion rests on the assumption that parents’
utility does not depend on residual variation in Uk. If it does, Uk and u are
correlated, and model 3 does not provide an unbiased estimator of η.
4.3 Panel methods
A panel data approach potentially can offer substantial improvement over the
previous estimates. Essentially, there are two major issues so far: Consumption
and other happiness generating factors are transmitted from child to parent.
Failure to fully control for the heterogeneity of these factors among parents
would induce bias due to correlated unobservables. Similarly, failure to control
for happiness generating factors among children would lead to endogeneity if
parents have paternalistic preferences. Panel data can eliminate the endogene-
ity problem caused by such unobservables provided they are time invariant.
In addition, fixed effects models will differ out genetic (and thus heritable)
differences in one’s attitude to happiness. For instance, “optimists” tend to
report higher well-being levels (for a given x) than “pessimists”, generating
spurious positive correlation between parents’ and children’s well-being if left
unaccounted for. The estimated model in this case is
Vp = αi + x′pβ + ηUk + u (4)
where αi is the individual specific fixed effect. Model 4 is a fixed effects version
of model 2 rather than model 3, based on the previous evidence that we cannot
reject the absence of paternalism. The results for this model are shown in the
fourth column of Table 5. From a statistical point of view—based on a Breusch
Pagan test and a Hausman test respectively—the fixed effects estimator is
clearly preferred over pooled OLS or a random effect GLS estimator, as the
assumption of exogeneity of time-invariant individual effects is rejected.
Including fixed effects reduces the estimated altruism coefficient—the
point estimate for η is 0.041—suggesting that correlation in time invariant
unobservables (consumption, paternalism, or personality) has some role to
play. However, the coefficient is still significantly greater than zero, and the
estimated income coefficient is also diminished, so that the trade-off ratio
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remains substantial. For example, a one standard deviation increase in the
child’s happiness is just offset by a 20% increase in household income.
4.4 Instrumental variable estimation
We finally re-estimated the model using instrumental variables. These esti-
mates should be seen as robustness checks rather than genuine attempts of
identifying causal effects, as the set of available instruments has a number of
serious shortcomings. In principle, the within panel estimator of model 4 is con-
sistent as long as all potential sources of endogeneity are time invariant. Hence,
there remains a problem if parents and children face correlated temporary
shocks to their happiness. Two sources for such correlated shocks have already
been discussed, namely correlated unobserved consumption components and
paternalistic preferences over unobserved determinants of child happiness. A
third source for temporal variation, not considered so far, is simultaneity. If
children have altruistic preferences with regard to their parents, we obtain a
simultaneous equations system with two equations
Vp = αi,p + x′pβp + ηpVk + vp
Vk = αi,k + x′kβk + ηkVp + vk (5)
Here, the first equation refers to the parents’ utility, with endogenous
variable Vp, explanatory variables xp and Vk, and stochastic error term up.
The second equation refers to the child’s utility, with endogenous variable Vk,
explanatory variables xk and U p, and stochastic error term vk. Single equation
estimation of the first equation by ordinary least squares is unbiased if Vk and
vp are uncorrelated. There are two circumstances when this assumption fails:
either the two temporary error terms vp and vk are correlated or ηk = 0 or
both. Suppose that σpk = 0. Then a simple test of the absence of altruism is
available if we assume that the altruism parameter is “mutual” and identical
since the ordinary least squares estimator is consistent under H0 : ηp = ηk = 0.
The practical importance of this result is limited, as there are many reasons to
think that σpk = 0.
With endogeneity, estimation of the structural parameter ηp can be based on
instrumental variables. We use two types of instruments. First, if we believe in
the absence of paternalistic preferences regarding specific observables (which
does not rule out paternalistic preferences per se as long as they are limited
to unobservables)—as exemplified by the system of Eq. 5—then the implied
exclusion from the first structural equation makes all variables in xk candidate
instruments. In our model, there are 11 such variables (age and age squared,
good health, married, divorced, years of schooling, unemployed, own children,
house ownership, log household income, log household size; all measured
for children). Second, a 12th instrument is based on the child’s prediction
of its “happiness in five years from now”. While this variable may be a
good instrument for measurement error, it likely fails to provide a source
of genuinely independent variation, in particular as future happiness is very
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closely correlated with current happiness, so that endogeneity issues carry
over. Re-estimating the model without this instrument did not make any
sizeable difference.
The instrumental variable results are shown in the last column of Table 5.
In the first-stage regression, which is not shown here, health, employment, and
income have strong explanatory power. The instruments are highly significant
as a group, with an F-statistic of 212 (p value = 0.000). Since there are more
instruments than endogenous variables, we can test for the overidentifying
restrictions. The F-statistic for this test has a p value of 0.382. Thus, we
fail to reject the overidentifying restrictions: If one of the instruments is
valid, then we do not reject that the others are so, too. This does of course
not prove that the instruments are valid. We have discussed the substantive
limitations of the available instruments earlier on, suggesting serious caveats
to the interpretation of the results.
Still, we find it reassuring that the IV estimates fall within the range of
estimates obtained from the previous estimation methods. The estimate of ηp
in the instrumented fixed effects model is 0.084, an increase relative to the
non-instrumented fixed effects model by a factor of about two. The direction
of change suggests the presence of a negative correlation between the two
idiosyncratic error terms vp and vk. One possible explanation would be that
the correlation is driven by paternalistic preferences over unobservables. For
example, the parents may dislike a new boyfriend, or the fact that their child
starts taking drugs, while these things increase the happiness of the child. An
increase in the estimated coefficient after instrumenting can also be accounted
for by measurement error, which is commonly exacerbated by taking within
differences and which leads to attenuation bias.
The estimated income trade-off ratio in this model is 0.29 which is very
similar to the trade-off ratio of 0.28 found in the pooled model 2. Thus, a 1
standard deviation increase in child happiness is just offset by an increase in
log income of 0.45.
4.5 Further robustness checks
We conducted some sub-sample checks to explore the robustness of the main
association. Results are shown in Table 6 (we report only the estimated η
coefficients; all models include the same regressors as those used in Table 5). In
a first split, we estimate separate models for mothers and fathers. The results
are very similar. There is no clear indication that the altruism parameter is
different for mothers than for fathers.
Second, we assess the sensitivity of the results to averaging over multiple
child observations by restricting the sample to parents with one child only, or
by matching parents with their oldest child only. Results show that averaging
is inconsequential. The results are very similar in the full sample, the only child
sample, and the oldest child sample.
A third comparison is between children who live in the same county and
parent–child pairs where the distance between the two households is least
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Table 6 Results for different samples
Eq. 1 Eq. 2 Eq. 3 Eq. 4
Women (n = 4,675)
Happiness of child 0.266a 0.183a 0.038 0.077c
(0.026) (0.024) (0.026) (0.035)
Men (n = 3,955)
Happiness of child 0.230a 0.150a 0.043b 0.098a
(0.029) (0.026) (0.025) (0.036)
Only 1 child living outside the parents household (n = 6,524)
Happiness of child 0.226a 0.153a 0.028 0.081a
(0.025) (0.022) (0.024) (0.030)
First child (n = 7,646)
Happiness of child 0.216a 0.140a 0.024 0.070a
(0.023) (0.020) (0.021) (0.026)
Living in same county (n = 5,301)
Happiness of child 0.231a 0.160a 0.033 0.076a
(0.028) (0.025) (0.021) (0.032)
Living at least 50 km apart (n = 1,919)
Happiness of child 0.222a 0.160a −0.013 0.061
(0.058) (0.050) (0.032) (0.058)
Moved out during the last year (n = 1,073)
Happiness of child 0.301a 0.192a 0.164c 0.183
((0.049) (0.041) (0.071) (0.114)
Moved out more than 10 years ago (n = 2,968)
Happiness of child 0.210a 0.167a 0.045 0.071b
(0.038) (0.034) (0.031) (0.041)
Controls No Yes Yes Yes
Fixed effects No No Yes Yes
Instruments No No No Yes
See Table 5; only the estimated altruism parameters ηˆ, together with standard error in parentheses,
are shown here
aSignificant at 1%
bSignificant at 10%
cSignificant at 5%
50 km. One might conjecture that the estimated altruism parameter is greater
for children living in the same county. First, parents might see these children
more often, providing better information on their happiness. Second, part of
the correlation might be spurious because living nearby exposes parents and
children to the same regional shocks (for example, labor market conditions).
This effect will be less pronounced for more distant children. Finally, distance
may also be an endogenous choice by children, and it is conceivable that it
increases with decreasing happiness interdependence.
The conjecture of a negative relationship between interdependence and
distance is not supported by the evidence. Indeed, the sizes of the coefficients
in the “distant sample” and in the “nearby” sample are quite similar. In the
distant sample, the fixed effects IV estimates are insignificant, but this can
be largely attributed to the smaller sample size of that group. Moreover, it
can be shown that the point estimate for the income trade-off ratio in the
instrumented model in the distant sample is even at the higher end, as the
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estimated income coefficient is only 0.11. A point increase in child happiness
therefore corresponds to a 0.061/0.11 = 0.55 increase in log household income.
Finally, we compare children who moved out recently with those who
moved out at least 10 years ago. Again, one would expect that the estimated
altruism parameter is greater for those children who just moved out of
their home, for instance, because parents can be expected to have better
information on the happiness of these children compared to those who left
home earlier. We find some larger estimates for the recent sample. However,
the results for the sub-sample of children who left home at least 10 years
ago remain statistically significant and very similar to the overall results.
While the point estimates for η thus vary somewhat depending on sub-sample
and specification, there is nevertheless a clear message in these results. The
“coefficient of effective sympathy” is an important component of well-being,
happiness appears to be interdependent.
5 Conclusions
Modeling happiness interdependence is a promising new area of research that
allows for a quantification and direct testing of the altruism hypothesis. Using
data from the German Socio-Economic Panel for the years 2000–2004, we
constructed a dataset on extended families, comprised of a parent household
and related households of adult children. We estimated the association be-
tween parent and child happiness using a number of specifications, including
fixed effects models with and without instrumental variables, and found robust
evidence for a statistically significant positive association.
Since parents’ happiness is positively related to the happiness of their chil-
dren, parents potentially have incentives to transfer income to their children.
We can invert the income compensation ratio to obtain the increase in child
happiness required for compensating for a given reduction in income. Based
on our estimates, these range between 2.2 and 5. For a 1% decrease in own
income, child happiness must then increase by between 0.02 and 0.05 for full
compensation. For larger responses, transfers will increase parents’ happiness.
Assuming that children respond in the same way to income as their parents,
such large transfer induced happiness increases will only materialize if children
have much lower incomes, for only then is it possible that a 1% transfer of
parental income can increase child income by several percent.
Our approach to and finding of interdependent happiness have implications
beyond the specific issue of altruism within the extended family. More broadly,
such interdependence implies that happiness has an important collective di-
mension that was ignored by much of prior research. As also found in a current
paper on happiness among friends (Fowler and Christakis 2008), happiness
seems to be “contagious”. Increasing the happiness of one person is associated
with happiness spillovers among a pool of related persons. This is an important
insight when thinking about the welfare implications of policies. In particular,
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contagion implies that the social benefit of an intervention that makes one
person happier is likely to exceed the private benefit by far.
The analysis in this paper is a first step toward gaining an understanding
of the collective dimension of happiness and interdependence as a proximate
mechanism for altruism. There are at least two promising avenues for further
research. One is a more detailed exploration of individual heterogeneity in the
“sympathy” parameter. The other is a confirmation of the nature of causality,
based on better instruments that capture genuinely exogenous variation in
child happiness. Such an analysis needs to confront the issue that the relation-
ships people maintain, be it within the extended family or outside with friends,
may be partly self-selected: At what time children move out, how far they
move, and what contact they keep are influenced by both parents and children
attitudes and may reflect in part the degree of happiness interdependence
between the two.
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